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Abstract   It is well-understood that a given gain in life expectancy can, in principle, be generated by 
any one of an infinite number of different types of perturbation in an individual’s survival function. 
Since it seems unlikely that the typical individual will be indifferent between these various types of 
perturbation, the idea that there exists a unique willingness to pay-based Value of a Statistical Life 
Year (VSLY), even for individuals within a given age-group, appears to be ill-founded. This paper 
examines the issue from a theoretical perspective. Within the context of a simple multi-period model 
it transpires that if gains in life expectancy are computed on an undiscounted basis then it will indeed 
be necessary to adjust the magnitude of the VSLY to accommodate the nature of the perturbation in 
the survival function, as well as the age of those affected. If, by contrast, gains in life expectancy are 
computed on an appropriately discounted basis then a unique VSLY will be applicable in all cases. 
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Under the standard definition, the Value of Statistical Life (VSL)1 is the aggregate current 
willingness to pay for marginal reductions in the probability of premature death which, taken over 
the group of people affected, will reduce the expected number of deaths during the forthcoming 
period by precisely one - see, for example, Jones-Lee (1989) or Viscusi (1998) 2. It therefore follows 
that since a gain in life expectancy for an individual can only be achieved by reducing her probability 
of death in some future period or periods (or equivalently, by an outward shift in the individual’s 
survival curve), then the Value of a Statistical Life Year (VSLY)3, defined as aggregate current 
willingness to pay for marginal gains in individual life expectancy that sum to one year, is 
conceptually intimately related to the VSL. Appropriately defined and estimated, the VSL and 
VSLY therefore constitute alternative but basically compatible ways of expressing the willingness to 
pay (WTP) - based value of a safety improvement.  
 
More specifically, consider a large group of n individuals each enjoying a 1/n reduction in the risk of 
death during the coming year, thereby reducing the mathematical expectation of the number of 
deaths by one and hence preventing one “statistical fatality”. Denoting the ith individual’s marginal 
rate of substitution of wealth for risk of death during the coming year by mi, then her current 
willingness to pay for the risk reduction will be closely approximated by mi × 1/n. It therefore 
follows that, summed over the affected group of n individuals, aggregate current willingness to pay 
for the  reduction in the risk of death during the coming year (i.e. the VSL) is given by the mean of 
mi for the group concerned. In turn, the i
th individual’s gain in life expectancy resulting from the risk 
reduction is - to a close approximation - given by Eli × 1/n, where Eli is her current life expectancy
4. 
Hence, summed across the n individuals, the aggregate gain in life expectancy is equal to the mean 
of Eli. Aggregate current willingness to pay per year’s gain in aggregate undiscounted life 
expectancy will therefore be given by the mean of mi (i.e. the VSL) divided by the mean of Eli. For a 
more detailed discussion, see Mason et al (2009).  
 
However, the argument just developed has focused on a first-period risk reduction and it is important 
to appreciate the fact that - as noted in Hammitt (2007) - a given gain in life expectancy could, in 
principle, be generated by any one of an infinite number of different types of perturbation in an 
individual’s survival function or, equivalently, in his/her future hazard rates (where the hazard rate in 
period t is the individual’s probability of death during that period, conditional on having survived all 
                                              
1
 Or as it is now more commonly referred to in the UK, the Value of Preventing a Statistical Fatality (VPF). 
2 For alternative (but basically similar) definitions of the willingness to pay-based VSL, see Johansson (2001) 
and Blomqvist (2002).  
3
 Or as it is sometimes referred to, the VOLY. 
4
 For the sake of analytical simplicity, in the argument that follows it is assumed that if death is to 
occur in any given year then it does so at the end of the year. Based on this assumption, the gain in 
life expectancy resulting from a 1/n reduction in the risk of death during the coming year will, 
strictly speaking, be equal to the product of remaining life expectancy conditional on survival of the 
coming year and 1/n.  
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preceding periods). As argued in Johansson (2001), a priori, it seems somewhat unlikely that the 
typical individual would be indifferent between these various different types of perturbation, given 
the effect of discounting and uncertainty concerning future survival, and empirical evidence appears 
to support this conclusion – see, for example, Cropper et al (1994) or Viscusi and Aldy (2003). As a 
result, the magnitude of the VSLY could in fact be significantly affected by the precise nature of the 
hazard rate perturbation that generates the gain in life expectancy. The intuitive explanation for this 
is actually quite straightforward. For example, consider two safety improvements, both of which 
generate the same gain in undiscounted life expectancy, but with the first involving a reduction in 
the hazard rate for the coming year and the second a reduction in a later year’s hazard rate. Given a 
positive personal rate of time preference, the first hazard rate reduction will then generate a larger 
gain in discounted life expectancy than the second and can therefore naturally be expected to be 
more highly valued than the second by the individual affected.         
 
As far as public sector health and safety decisions are concerned, three types of hazard rate 
perturbation would seem to deserve particular attention, namely: i) a one-off reduction in the risk of 
death during the coming period; ii) a constant ongoing reduction in the hazard rate faced by an 
individual in each future period and iii) a proportional reduction in all of an individual’s future 
hazard rates. Given that the typical individual’s hazard rate can, as a reasonable approximation,  be 
expected to follow a Gompertz Curve and hence grow with age at an effectively exponential rate5, it 
follows that the last of these three types of perturbation would involve a risk reduction that also 
increased exponentially over future periods. In fact the proportional reduction would seem to be of 
particular importance given that, according to current epidemiological evidence, a proportional 
reduction in future hazard rates is one of the main long-term beneficial health effects of a reduction 
in air pollution – see, for example, Pope et al (1995) or Hurley et al (2000). 
 
While some attempts have been made to examine the WTP-based valuation of different types of 
perturbation in an individual’s future hazard rates – see, for example, Rosen (1988), Johansson 
(1996), Johannesson et al (1997) and Johansson (2001) – to the best of our knowledge, none have 
provided a clear indication of how the magnitude of the WTP-based VSLYs in each of the three key 
cases referred to in the preceding paragraph can be expected to relate to each other and how the 
relative magnitudes of these three different VSLYs can be expected to vary with factors such as age 
and personal rates of time preference. 
 
As a first step towards shedding some light on the issue, the authors of this paper conducted  an 
exploratory stated-preference study aimed at establishing the preference ordering of a random 
sample of the UK public over the three different ways of generating a given gain in life expectancy 
                                              
               
5
 See, for example, Wetterstrand (1981) or Jenkins (2005) Ch.3.   
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(i.e. one-off, constant ongoing and proportional reduction in future hazard rates) – see Nielsen et al 
(2010). In the event, the study produced two key results, namely a) that a substantial majority of 
respondents displayed a clear preference ordering over the three options (only 7% were indifferent 
between all three) and b) preferences were more or less evenly split as far as the most-preferred 
option was concerned.  
 
While the study just referred to provides some empirical information concerning people’s attitudes 
towards different possible ways of generating a given gain in life expectancy, it was admittedly only 
an exploratory study based on a relatively small sample of 40-50 year olds and one is still bound to 
wonder how standard theory would rank the three alternatives in terms of the relative magnitudes of 
the implied VSLYs. The present paper aims to provide a brief and simple  analysis of the issue from 
a purely theoretical perspective. In particular, we examine the extent to which the nature of the 
hazard rate perturbation can be expected to affect the magnitude of the VSLY when the latter is 
defined in terms of undiscounted life expectancy. We also explore the implications of defining the 
VSLY in terms of discounted life expectancy and clarify the conditions under which the resultant 
value will be completely independent of the nature of the hazard rate perturbation.  
 
The basic assumptions underpinning the model used in the analysis are set out in Section 1. The 
VSLYs implied by this model for each of the three types of perturbation in an individual’s hazard 
rates, with life expectancy computed on an undiscounted basis, are then derived in Section 2 and the 
relative magnitudes of the three VSLYs are compared for different personal utility discount rates and 
different age groups. On the assumption that individual hazard rates follow an exponential Gompertz 
Curve it transpires that with utility discount rates set at plausible levels the three VSLYs do indeed 
differ to a substantial extent even for older age groups. Section 3 then examines the implications of 
defining life expectancy on a discounted basis. Significantly, and in marked contrast to the results 
that emerge if life expectancy is left undiscounted, it turns out that with discounted life expectancy 
computed using the personal utility discount rate then the VSLY for a given individual will be 
completely independent of the nature of the hazard rate perturbation that generates the gain in life 
expectancy. However, with the VSLY defined on the basis of discounted life expectancy it would be 
essential to ensure that any gain in life expectancy being valued should also be appropriately 
discounted. In particular, it is argued that calculating the discounted present value of n years 
remaining life expectancy as if it were a one-unit, n-year annuity is - strictly speaking - 
inappropriate, though with the discount rate set at a reasonable level it appears that the error in doing 
so is significant only for those beyond middle age. 
 
In Section 4 we then focus on the way in which the VSLY might be expected to vary with age in 
both the undiscounted and discounted life expectancy cases. Again, the magnitude of the VSLY 
defined on the basis of undiscounted life expectancy varies substantially with the age of the affected 
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individual or group. However, if by contrast the VSLY is defined in terms of discounted life 
expectancy computed using the personal utility discount rate then for an individual with given tastes, 
preferences and wealth, the VSLY will be completely independent of age per se.  
 
In light of these findings, Section 5 then examines the alternative possible ways in which one might 
legitimately approach the problem of valuing gains in life expectancy in the cost-benefit analysis of 
health and safety projects and how best to take account of effects on adults and children in the 
current generation, as well as members of future generations.  
 
Finally, Section 6 provides a summary and concluding comments. In particular, it is argued that in 
light of the paper’s main findings the most straightforward and unambiguous way in which to 
proceed is by defining the VSLY on the basis of discounted life expectancy, with discounting carried 
out using the sort of rate at which individuals discount future utility gains (i.e. in the region of 6-
8%), rather than the rate that is typically applied in public sector health and safety decisions (i.e.  in 
the UK and USA, 1.5-3.5%). Under this approach there would appear to be a persuasive case in 
favour of employing a unique VSLY that is completely independent of the nature of the hazard rate 
perturbation that generates the gain in life expectancy and is also independent of the age of those 
affected. This would clearly have significant practical advantages.  
 
1. The basic model  
 
Existing theoretical analyses of the value of changes in life expectancy, such as Rosen (1988),  
Johannesson et al (1997) and more recently, Hammitt (2013), have been based on relatively 
sophisticated models that aim to take careful and comprehensive account of the various issues 
related to personal intertemporal decision-making, such as the planning of lifetime consumption, 
borrowing, lending,  anticipated health-state and other factors. However, the resultant mathematical 
expressions and related arguments in these analyses are somewhat complex and  in some respects, 
not immediately transparent. 
 
In order to keep the argument and underlying algebraic expressions in the present paper as simple 
and comprehensible as possible, the model underpinning the analysis that follows will therefore be 
based on some rather strong simplifying assumptions. Nonetheless, we believe that the model 
constitutes a sufficiently close approximation to reality to capture the most significant effects of the 
principal determinants of the typical individual’s valuation of gains in life expectancy within a 
relatively straightforward mathematical framework. In particular, it will be assumed that: 
 
 The individual is an expected utility maximiser. 
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 If the individual survives, then she anticipates that she will enjoy an effectively constant future 
utility flow of 𝑢 per annum, but future utilities are subject to a personal discount rate of i per 
annum.  
 
 The individual’s holding of life-insurance and annuities are such as to ensure that her current  
marginal utility of wealth is effectively independent of the length of time for which she may 
actually survive6. 
 
With time, t, measured annually from the present7, denoting the individual’s survival function 
(which gives the probability of surviving to the beginning of year t) by S(t) and assuming for the 
sake of simplicity that if death is to occur in year t then it does so at the end of the year, it follows 
that the individual’s remaining life expectancy, El (expressed on a discrete time basis), is given by: 
 
𝐸𝑙 = ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑇𝑡=1           (1) 
 
where T is the maximum  number of years for which the individual could reasonably be expected to 
continue to survive. 
 
In turn - under the simplifying assumptions set out above - the individual’s remaining lifetime 
expected utility, EU, is given by: 
 
𝐸𝑈 = ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒−𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1  .         (2) 
 
Denoting the individual’s hazard rate for year t by pt (where, in the discrete time case, the hazard rate 
for any year is defined as the probability of death during that year conditional on having survived to 
the beginning of the year), it follows that the survival function, S(t), is given by:   
 
𝑆(𝑡) =  (1 – 𝑝1)(1 – 𝑝2)(1 – 𝑝3) … (1 – 𝑝𝑡−1)      (3) 
 
so that 𝑆(1) = 1, 𝑆(2) = (1 – 𝑝1) , 𝑆(3) = (1 – 𝑝1)(1 – 𝑝2), etc. 
 
It then follows from equations (1) and (3) that the effect of a marginal variation in the hazard rate for 
year τ on life expectancy is given by:  
 
                                              
6
 For a more detailed discussion of life insurance and annuity contracts, see Jones-Lee (1989), Ch.3. 
7
 So that, for example, an individual of age 40 in year 1 (i.e. the current year) will be of age 40 + t in year t +1.      
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𝜕𝐸𝑙
𝜕𝑝𝜏
= − ∑
𝑆 (𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1  ,         (4) 
 
while from equations (2) and (3) the effect on lifetime expected utility is given by:   
 
𝜕𝐸𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝜏
= − ∑
𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1  .         (5) 
 
In fact the intuitive explanation for these results is quite straightforward. For example, in equation 
(4), the term ∑
𝑆 (𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1   would be the area under the survival curve from year τ +1 to year T if the 
term (1- pτ) were to be set equal to unity in the expression for S(t) for all t ≥ τ +1, which would 
require that pτ be set equal to  zero. This area therefore constitutes the loss of life expectancy that 
would occur if  pτ  were to increase from zero to one, so that survival beyond the end of year τ was 
impossible. Graphically, in the discrete-time case this is  represented by the heavily shaded area in 
Figure 1 inflated by the factor  1/(1-pτ). Given that El is linear in pτ  , this loss of life expectancy 
resulting from a unit increase in pτ   clearly constitutes the rate at which El decreases as pτ  increases. 
Similar comments apply to the effect of an increase in pτ   on lifetime expected utility.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Survival function 
 
Now consider a vector of marginal hazard rate reductions [δp1, δp2,…,δpT ] . From equation (4) it 
then follows that the resultant gain in undiscounted life expectancy, δEl , is given by: 
 
𝛿𝐸𝑙 = ∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1          (6)  
t 
S(t) 
τ 0 
1 
Year 
τ  
T 
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if by contrast, life expectancy is subject to the personal discount rate, i , then the resultant gain in 
discounted life expectancy, δEld , would be: 
 
𝛿𝐸𝑙𝑑 = ∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)𝑒−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1          (7)  
 
In turn, from equation (5), the gain in lifetime expected utility, δEU , is given by: 
 
𝛿𝐸𝑈 = ∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1         (8)  
 
so that the individual’s current willingness to pay, δw , for the marginal hazard rate reductions is:  
 
𝛿𝑤 =
1
𝑢′
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1        (9) 
 
where 𝑢′denotes the individual’s current marginal utility of wealth.  
 
Now consider a large group of individuals like the one under analysis. From equations (6) and (9) it 
follows that their aggregate current willingness to pay for marginal gains in life expectancy that, 
taken over the group, sum to one undiscounted year – which will be denoted by VSLY - is given by:   
 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑌 =
1
𝑢′
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏 )
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
         (10)   
 
If, by contrast, we take aggregate current willingness to pay for one discounted life year – which will 
be denoted by VSLYd  - then from equations (7) and (9) this is given by:  
 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑌𝑑 =
1
𝑢′
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏 )
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+ 1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝛿𝑝𝜏
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
         (11) 
 
which simplifies to VSLYd  = 𝑢/𝑢′, whatever the nature of the vector of hazard rate reductions. It is 
therefore clear that provided remaining life expectancy is defined on an appropriately discounted 
basis then a common  VSLY will be applicable, whatever the nature of the marginal hazard rate 
reductions that give rise to the gain in life expectancy.    
 
Notice that if the only hazard rate that is actually reduced is that for the coming year then the 
numerator in the expression for VSLYd  given in equation (11) is equal to the individual’s marginal 
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rate of substitution of wealth for risk of death during the coming year (which, for a large group of 
individuals similar to the one under analysis, will constitute the VSL for that group) multiplied by 
δp1,  while the denominator is her discounted remaining life expectancy conditional on surviving the 
coming year multiplied by δp1. This means that  the universally applicable VSLYd  (= 𝑢/𝑢′)  can 
legitimately be computed directly from a pre-determined VSL simply by dividing the latter by 
appropriately discounted remaining life expectancy conditional on surviving the current year.  
 
Clearly, then, the VSLY defined on the basis of appropriately discounted life expectancy has the 
marked advantage of general applicability. It is therefore not surprising that it has become fairly 
common practice to use some form of discounting in the definition and computation of the VSLY – 
see, for example, Moore and Viscusi (1988), Viscusi et al (1997), Gyrd-Hansen and Sogard (1998), 
Hirth et al (2000), Johansson (2001), Hammitt (2007), Aldy and Viscusi (2007) or Hammitt (2013). 
The OECD also recommends that the VSLY should be derived from a pre-determined estimate of 
the VSL on the basis of discounted life expectancy – see OECD (2012) Annex 1.A1.  
 
However, the OECD recommendation does not specify the level at which the discount rate should be 
set and the argument developed above clearly requires that discounting should be based on the 
personal discount rate, i. It should also be emphasized that the definition of discounted life 
expectancy given in equation (7) is, strictly speaking, not equivalent to the discounted present value 
of a one-unit, n-year annuity with n set equal to remaining life expectancy, which is the definition 
that has been fairly widely applied in the literature – see, for example, Hirth et al (2000) or Aldy and 
Viscusi (2007). It is therefore clear that while the VSLY defined on the basis of appropriately 
discounted life expectancy has the advantage of general applicability to all forms of marginal 
perturbation in future hazard rates, it is in principle essential that the discounting should be based on 
the appropriate discount rate and should be carried out using the correct procedure.  
 
This then naturally raises the question of whether it would, in practice, be more straightforward to 
define the VSLY in terms of undiscounted life expectancy – as in, for example Johannessson (1997) 
or Mason et al (2009) - which would avoid the necessity to confront the problems posed by selecting 
an appropriate discount rate and discounting procedure. The answer to this question clearly depends, 
at least in part, on the extent to which the magnitude of the VSLY defined in terms of undiscounted 
life expectancy can be expected to vary with the nature of the perturbation in future hazard rates that 
gives rise to the gain in life expectancy. The next section therefore aims to provide a comparison 
between the magnitude of the VSLY (defined in terms of undiscounted life expectancy) under the 
three key types of hazard rate perturbation identified in the introduction i.e.  a one-off, first year 
hazard rate reduction; a constant ongoing reduction; and a proportional reduction in all future hazard 
rates.  
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2. The VSLY based on undiscounted life expectancy  
 
2.1 The VSLY for a reduction in the first year hazard rate  
 
If the only hazard rate to be reduced is that for the first year and life expectancy is undiscounted, 
then from equation (10) it follows that the VSLY, which will be denoted by VSLYa , is given by
8 :   
 
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑌𝑎 =
1
𝑢′
∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝1 )
𝑇
𝑡=2
∑
𝑆 (𝑡)
(1−𝑝1 )
𝑇
𝑡=2
 .        (12)  
 
2.2 The VSLY for a constant reduction in all future hazard rates  
 
If all future hazard rates are reduced by the same amount and life expectancy is undiscounted, then 
from equation (10) it follows that the VSLY, which will be denoted by VSLYb , is given by: 
  
𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑌𝑏 =
1
𝑢′
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1
 .       (13) 
      
2.3 The VSLY for a proportional reduction in all future hazard rates 
 
It will be assumed that the individual’s hazard rate, pt , for year t (measured from the present) is 
given by a Gompertz Curve - see Wetterstrand (1981) or Jenkins (2005) - so that:  
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑒
𝛽(𝛾+𝑡)           (14) 
 
where γ is the individual’s current age and α and β are positive constants. 
 
From equation (14) it follows that if the first year hazard rate reduction is δp, then a proportional 
reduction in all future hazard rates will imply that:   
 
𝛿𝑝𝑡 = 𝛿𝑝𝑒
𝛽(𝑡−1)         (15) 
 
                                              
8
 The summation in equation (12) runs from t = 2 since, by definition, S(2) denotes the probability of survival to the 
beginning of period 2 and is hence, from equations (1) and (3), the first term in the expression for El that is affected by 
a variation in p1 .  
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so that  the hazard rate reduction will grow exponentially over time. If life expectancy is 
undiscounted then it follows from equations (10) and (15) that the VSLY, which will be denoted by 
VSLYc , is given by:  
 
 𝑉𝑆𝐿𝑌𝑐 =
1
𝑢′
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑢𝑒
−𝑖𝑡
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1 𝑒
𝛽 (𝜏−1)
∑ ∑
𝑆(𝑡)
(1−𝑝𝜏)
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝑇−1
𝜏=1 𝑒
𝛽 (𝜏−1)
 .       (16) 
From a purely intuitive perspective it seems clear that since the gain in life expectancy generated by 
a multiperiod reduction in future hazard rates is, in part, driven by effects that occur in later years of 
life, then the resultant gain in discounted utility – and hence willingness to pay – will inevitably be 
less than that corresponding to the same gain in life expectancy generated by a reduction only in the 
first year hazard rate. This discounting effect will be even more pronounced in the case of a 
proportional reduction in all future hazard rates, given that the latter are themselves typically 
increasing over time. A priori, it therefore seems natural to expect that VSLYa  > VSLYb  > VSLYc .   
 
In fact, the expressions in equations (12), (13) and (16) clearly indicate that the actual extent of the 
difference between VSLYa , VSLYb and VSLYc will be determined by the magnitude of the personal 
discount rate, i , the Gompertz Function parameter, β, the age of the individual under analysis and 
the precise form of the survival function, S(t). In order to obtain a clear indication of the relative 
magnitudes of VSLYa  , VSLYb  and VSLYc  it is therefore necessary to specify the magnitude of β and 
hence the form of S(t). 
 
Since, by definition, the survival function, S(t), gives the probability that an individual of age γ will 
survive for at least a further t years to age γ + t  then (for the sake of analytical convenience, with 
time now expressed as a continuous variable) it will necessarily be the case that the hazard rate, pt , 
will be given by: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = −
𝑆′(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
          (17) 
 
where S′(t) is the first derivative of S(t). 
 
Hence, with pt  given by a Gompertz Curve, then from equations (14) and (17):    
 
  
𝑆′(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
= − 𝛼𝑒𝛽(𝛾+𝑡).         (18) 
 
From equation (18), given that with time measured as a continuous variable then by definition  
S(0) = 1, it follows that:   
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𝑆(𝑡) =   𝑒
𝛼
𝛽
(𝑒𝛽𝛾−𝑒𝛽 (𝛾+𝑡))
.         (19) 
 
However, given that the analysis in this paper is based on a discrete-time model with S(t) defined as 
the probability of survival to the beginning of year t (so that, for example, S(1) = 1), then it will be 
necessary to modify the expression for  S(t) to take account of this. In the discrete-time analysis that 
follows, S(t) will therefore be defined as:    
 
𝑆(𝑡) =   𝑒
𝛼
𝛽
(𝑒𝛽𝛾−𝑒𝛽 (𝛾+𝑡−1))
.         (20) 
 
Using mortality statistics for 2009 – 2011 reported in Office for National Statistics (2013) and 
averaging over males and females, the Gompertz Function parameters for England have been 
estimated to be α = 0.000052 and β  = 0.084. Taking the maximum possible remaining  survival 
time, T, for an individual of age γ to be such that γ + T =116 years 9,  the ratios VSLYb /VSLYa  and 
VSLYc /VSLYa  have then been computed from equations (12), (13), (16) and (20) for various ages and 
levels of the personal discount rate, i, and are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Ratio of VSLYb and VSLYc to VSLYa by age at intervention and exponential discount rate 
  VSLYb / VSLYa 
    
VSLYc / VSLYa 
  Personal discount rate, i   
    
Personal discount rate, i 
Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10%   Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10% 
20 0.94 0.77 0.59 0.46 0.37 0.31   20 0.86 0.53 0.59 0.14 0.08 0.05 
30 0.95 0.80 0.63 0.51 0.42 0.35   30 0.88 0.59 0.63 0.21 0.13 0.09 
40 0.95 0.82 0.68 0.56 0.47 0.40   40 0.90 0.66 0.68 0.29 0.20 0.14 
50 0.96 0.85 0.72 0.61 0.53 0.46   50 0.92 0.72 0.72 0.38 0.28 0.22 
60 0.97 0.87 0.76 0.67 0.59 0.53   60 0.94 0.78 0.76 0.49 0.39 0.32 
70 0.97 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.66 0.60   70 0.96 0.84 0.81 0.59 0.51 0.44 
80 0.98 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.68   80 0.97 0.88 0.85 0.70 0.63 0.57 
90 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.76   90 0.98 0.92 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.69 
 
 
                                              
9
 With the parameters of the Gompertz Function set at the estimated levels, then it follows from 
equation (12) that the maximum age at which the hazard rate remains less than unity is 117. In fact, with the 
hazard rate defined as a probability density – as in equation (17) – it is entirely possible for the rate to exceed 
unity. However, given that the main body of the argument developed  in this paper has been based on a 
discrete time model with  hazard rates treated as probabilities (rather than probability densities),  then it is 
necessary to ensure that they do not exceed unity. Given that the oldest recorded age at death in the UK is 
115 years and 228 days, then it seems reasonable to set the maximum possible remaining survival time,T, so 
that an individual cannot survive beyond his/her 116th year.  
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It is clear from Table 1 that the VSLY ratios are, not surprisingly, both strictly decreasing functions 
of the personal discount rate, i, and increasing functions of age (and hence decreasing functions of 
remaining life expectancy). In addition, the results in Table 1 indicate that as the discount rate 
approaches zero, both VSLY ratios approach unity for all age groups. This is again perhaps not 
surprising, given that from equations (12), (13) and (16) it is clear that with i = 0, then for all three 
types of hazard rate perturbation the VSLY simplifies to 𝑢/𝑢′ which, it will be recalled, is equal to 
the VSLY defined in terms of appropriately discounted life expectancy.   
 
What is not so obvious a priori is the extent to which the VSLY ratios are affected by variations in 
the discount rate and age. Thus, for example, for those below the age of 70, even with a personal 
discount rate as low 2% per annum, the VSLYb /VSLYa ratio falls below 0.9 and drops to 0.77 at age 
20, while the VSLYc /VSLYa ratio goes from 0.84 down to 0.53 over the same age range. With the 
personal discount rate set at 6% - which is closer to the sort of rate that appears to underpin private 
health and safety decisions in the UK and USA i.e. about 6-8% (see, for example, Viscusi et al 
(1997), Cairns and van der Pol (2000)  and Mc Donald et al (2016)) – the VSLYb /VSLYa ratio falls 
from 0.73 down to 0.46, while the VSLYc /VSLYa ratio goes from 0.59 down to as low as 0.14 as age 
is reduced from 70 to 20. Clearly, therefore, application of a VSLY computed as the VSL divided by 
undiscounted remaining life expectancy (i.e. VSLYa )  in the valuation of a gain in life expectancy 
generated either by a constant ongoing or proportional reduction in future hazard rates could 
constitute a serious overestimate.  
 
As is clear from equation (2), the results reported in Table 1 are based on the assumption that the 
intertemporal preferences of the individual under analysis are such as to warrant the application of 
exponential discount factors to future expected utilities. However, there is a considerable body of 
evidence suggesting that in the case of individual preferences concerning health and safety, some 
form of hyperbolic discounting may be a more accurate representation of the typical individual’s 
attitudes to future beneficial and harmful effects – see for example, Chapman (1996) or Khwaja et al 
(2007). The VSLY ratios have therefore also been computed with the discount factors e -it  in 
equations (12), (13) and (16) replaced by (1 + it)-1 and the results are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Ratio of VSLYb and VSLYc to VSLYa by age at intervention and simple hyperbolic 
discount rate 
 
   VSLYb / VSLYa  
  
   VSLYc / VSLYa 
  Personal discount rate, i   
  
  Personal discount rate, i   
Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10%   Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10% 
20 0.95 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.69   20 0.88 0.71 0.60 0.55 0.51 0.48 
30 0.95 0.87 0.8 0.76 0.73 0.70   30 0.90 0.74 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.51 
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40 0.96 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.72   40 0.92 0.77 0.67 0.61 0.58 0.55 
50 0.96 0.89 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.74   50 0.93 0.8 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.59 
60 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.76   60 0.95 0.84 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.64 
70 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.8 0.78   70 0.96 0.87 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.69 
80 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.81   80 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.75 
90 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.85   90 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.81 
 
 
 
Comparing the results in Table 2 with those reported in Table 1, it is clear that while replacement of 
exponential with hyperbolic discounting leaves the VSLY ratios for the older age groups largely 
unchanged, it does substantially attenuate the impact of delayed risk reductions for those with a 
longer remaining life expectancy. Nonetheless, the fact that even with a relatively modest personal 
discount rate of 6%, under hyperbolic discounting of future expected utilities the VSLYc /VSLYa ratio 
falls to 0.55 for an individual of age 20 indicates that the  nature of the hazard rate perturbation can 
still have a considerable effect on the implied value of an undiscounted statistical life year.  
 
3. The VSLY based on discounted life expectancy  
  
As shown above in Section 1, provided that the discount rate is set at the personal rate, i, and the 
appropriate discounting procedure is applied, then given the assumptions underpinning the analysis 
developed in this paper, it follows from equation (11) that the VSLY simplifies to VSLYd  = 𝑢/𝑢′ 
whatever the nature of the marginal reductions in future hazard rates that give rise to the gain in 
discounted life expectancy. Clearly, this conclusion also applies under hyperbolic discounting. But 
one is then bound to wonder to what extent the general applicability of the VSLY (defined in terms 
of discounted life expectancy) would be compromised if either the discount rate were to be set at a 
level that was not equal to the personal rate, i, or an inappropriate discounting procedure was 
applied.  
 
As far as the discount rate is concerned,  as already noted, the rate that people appear to apply in 
their own private health and safety decisions seems to lie in the region of about 6-8%. This is 
somewhat higher than the discount rate currently applied in public sector health and safety decision-
making in the UK and USA, which typically lies in the region of 1.5-3.5% - see, for example, HM 
Treasury (2003), Annex 6; UK Inter-departmental Group on Valuation of Life and Health (2010); 
NICE (2011) and Gold et al (1996). If anything, therefore, the discount rate that is typically applied 
in the computation of discounted life expectancy appears to lie well below the personal rate. This 
means that if the VSLY is computed as the VSL divided by discounted life expectancy calculated 
using the public sector discount rate then the result could be a serious underestimate of VSLYd  and 
will most certainly not be legitimately applicable to all types of hazard rate perturbation.   
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Turning to the discounting procedure used in the computation of discounted life expectancy, as 
already noted, it is fairly common practice to estimate the VSLY for a given age group by dividing 
the VSL for that age group by the discounted present value of a one-unit, n-year annuity, with n set 
equal to remaining life expectancy for the age group concerned. Clearly, this approach takes no 
account of other properties of the survival function besides remaining life expectancy and is 
therefore, at least in principle – as noted in Hammitt (2007) – only an approximation. 
 
 More specifically, given that the annuity approach involves discounting over a shorter future period, 
it will necessarily yield a higher figure for discounted remaining life expectancy than that produced 
by the “correct” approach. However, as shown below in Table 3, computations using the Gompertz 
Function parameters referred to above indicate that for discount rates set at reasonable levels (i.e. 
less than 8%), discounted life expectancy estimated using the annuity approach – denoted by Elan  - 
exceeds the figure resulting from application of the “correct” approach, Eld , to a significant extent 
(i.e. by more than about 5%) only for those above the age of 50, though the overestimate rises to 
over 10% by the age of 80. Since discounting using the annuity approach  is considerably more 
straightforward than the “correct” approach, it might therefore be argued that for practical purposes 
the annuity approach constitutes an acceptable approximation in most cases.  
       
Table 3. Comparison between results of “correct” and annuity approaches to computing 
discounted life expectancy 
 𝑬𝒍𝒅 𝑬𝒍𝒂𝒏 𝑬𝒍𝒅 𝑬𝒍𝒂𝒏 𝑬𝒍𝒅 𝑬𝒍𝒂𝒏 
 Age i = 2%  i = 6%  i = 10%  
20 34.51 35.18 15.52 15.78 9.41 9.49 
30 31.34 32.01 15.07 15.46 9.31 9.46 
40 27.64 28.55 14.35 14.95 9.11 9.38 
50 23.43 24.42 13.26 14.07 8.74 9.19 
60 18.84 19.48 11.72 12.56 8.11 8.73 
70 14.17 14.97 9.71 10.68 7.13 7.94 
80 9.83 10.56 7.41 8.30 5.81 6.64 
90 6.26 6.47 5.13 5.55 4.30 4.79 
 
Clearly, then, there would appear to be substantial practical  advantages associated with the 
definition of the VSLY in terms of  appropriately discounted life expectancy.   In light of this, it is 
natural to wonder whether there is an intuitively plausible explanation for why it should be so 
important to work with discounted life expectancy rather than life expectancy per se. The simplest 
explanation would appear to be that the ambiguity associated with specification of only the 
magnitude of a gain in undiscounted life expectancy effectively parallels the imprecision involved in 
giving only the magnitude of the gain in an individual’s expected wealth associated with a financial 
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investment, when what is really required in the latter case is information  concerning the effect on all 
parameters of the individual’s probability distribution of wealth in order to allow determination of 
the impact of the investment on his/her expected  utility of wealth . In the context of health and 
safety, specification of the effect of an intervention only on undiscounted life expectancy leaves the 
effect on lifetime expected utility essentially indeterminate, whereas specification of the effect on 
discounted life expectancy is, at least within the type of model underpinning the argument developed 
in this paper, sufficient to allow one to determine the impact on lifetime expected utility.  
 
4. Relationship between the VSLY and age 
 
The expressions for the VSLY given in equations (11), (12), (13) and (16) clearly provide the basis 
for an examination of the way in which the VSLY can be expected to vary with age, given the 
assumptions underpinning the model developed in this paper. Clearly, if the magnitude of the VSLY 
does depend on age then the level at which the VSLY is set in a cost-benefit analysis should be 
chosen so as to reflect the age of those enjoying the gain in life expectancy at the time at which the 
safety improvement generating the gain is implemented. In addition, if it is judged to be appropriate 
to set the value accorded to health and safety improvements for children at a premium, then this 
should clearly be reflected in the level at which the VSLY is set for children, though it can 
reasonably be argued that this should only apply to gains in life expectancy resulting from reductions 
in those hazard rates associated with childhood years. 
  
The first and perhaps most significant point to note is that from equation (11) it is clear that VSLYd  is 
equal to 𝑢/𝑢′ regardless of the magnitude of maximum possible remaining survival time, T, and is 
hence, for given levels of 𝑢 and 𝑢′, completely independent of age. This, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that VSLYd  for a given individual will be independent of his/her age, since the 
individual’s wealth - and hence both 𝑢 and 𝑢′can reasonably be expected to vary over time even if 
his/her tastes and preferences remain unchanged – see, for example, Aldy and Viscusi (2008). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that for given levels of 𝑢 and 𝑢′ the VSLY defined in terms of appropriately 
discounted life expectancy would not only constitute the legitimate basis for valuing all types of 
perturbation in the vector of future hazard rates, but would also be applicable to all age groups.   
 
However, in marked contrast, equations (12), (13) and (16) indicate equally clearly that with gains in 
life expectancy computed on an undiscounted basis, then even with 𝑢 and 𝑢′ held constant the 
magnitude of the VSLY not only varies with the nature of the perturbation in future hazard rates, but 
will also depend on the magnitude of  T and hence on the age of the individual concerned. In order 
to illustrate the effect of age, each of VSLYa, VSLYb and VSLYc have therefore been computed (with 
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expected utility subject to exponential discounting) as multiples of the constant VSLYd (=𝑢/𝑢′) for 
different age groups and are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Ratio of VSLYa and VSLYb to VSLYd by age at intervention and exponential discount rate 
  
VSLYa / VSLYd  
    
 VSLYb / VSLYd  
  Personal discount rate, i   
  
  Personal discount rate, i   
Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10%   Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10% 
20 0.85 0.55 0.34 0.24 0.18 0.14   20 0.80 0.42 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.04 
30 0.87 0.59 0.39 0.28 0.21 0.16   30 0.82 0.47 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.06 
40 0.89 0.64 0.44 0.32 0.25 0.20   40 0.85 0.52 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.08 
50 0.91 0.69 0.5 0.38 0.30 0.24   50 0.87 0.58 0.36 0.23 0.16 0.11 
60 0.92 0.74 0.57 0.45 0.36 0.30   60 0.89 0.64 0.43 0.3 0.21 0.16 
70 0.94 0.79 0.64 0.53 0.44 0.37   70 0.92 0.71 0.52 0.38 0.29 0.22 
80 0.96 0.84 0.71 0.61 0.53 0.47   80 0.94 0.77 0.61 0.48 0.39 0.32 
90 0.97 0.88 0.79 0.70 0.63 0.57   90 0.95 0.83 0.70 0.59 0.50 0.43 
               
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratio of VSLYc to VSLYd by age at intervention and exponential discount rate 
  VSLYc / VSLYd  
  Personal discount rate, i   
Age  0.5% 2%  4%  6%  8%  10% 
20 0.73 0.29 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 
30 0.76 0.35 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.01 
40 0.80 0.42 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.03 
50 0.83 0.5 0.26 0.14 0.08 0.05 
60 0.87 0.58 0.35 0.22 0.14 0.10 
70 0.90 0.66 0.45 0.31 0.22 0.16 
80 0.93 0.74 0.56 0.43 0.34 0.26 
90 0.95 0.82 0.67 0.56 0.47 0.39 
 
 
From Table 4 it is clear that with the VSLY defined in terms of undiscounted life expectancy, the 
age of the individual concerned will have a significant impact. This is particularly pronounced in the 
case of VSLYc , with the value almost trebling  as age increases from 20 to 90, even at a personal 
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discount rate as low as 2%, and increasing more than ten-fold over the same age span  when the 
discount rate is 6%. 
 
5. Applying the VSLYs in cost-benefit analysis  
 
From the argument developed above it is clear that the answer to the question of which VSLY 
should be applied in the cost-benefit analysis of a health or safety project and how the resultant 
benefit estimate should be weighed in the appraisal process will depend, inter alia, on the way in 
which the gain in life expectancy being valued has itself been estimated. 
 
In particular the following procedures would, in principle, appear to be entirely legitimate in the case 
of adults who are members of the current generation: 
 
5.1 Legitimate procedures for adults in the current generation 
 
 If the gain in life expectancy has been estimated on an undiscounted  basis, then it is essential 
that the appropriate VSLY (i.e. VSLYa , VSLYb  or VSLYc ) should be employed, with the choice 
depending on the nature of the perturbation in future hazard rates that has generated the life 
expectancy gain. In addition, as already noted, the VSLY should be set at a level that reflects the 
age of those who are enjoying the gain in life expectancy at the time at which the safety 
improvement that generates the gain is carried out. The resultant benefit measure should then not 
be subjected to any further discounting, given that the measure itself has already been derived in 
present-value terms. 
 If, by contrast, the gain in life expectancy has been estimated on a discounted basis using the 
personal discount rate, i , and the correct discounting procedure, then it would be appropriate to 
use  VSLYd  (computed as the VSL divided by discounted remaining life expectancy) for the 
typical individual, which as has already been noted, will effectively be equal to 𝑢/𝑢′ in the 
simplified model developed in this paper. This would apply regardless of the nature of the 
perturbation in future hazard rates or the age of the individuals affected. Again, it would be 
inappropriate to apply any further discounting to the resultant benefit measure, given that it has 
itself already been derived in present-value terms. 
 If the gain in life expectancy being valued has been estimated on a discounted basis, but the 
discount rate used is different from the personal rate, i, then strictly speaking, none of the 
VSLYs computed on an undiscounted basis - or those computed using the personal discount rate, 
i - would be applicable. Under such circumstances, it would seem that the most straightforward 
way in which to proceed would be by making the necessary adjustment to the estimated gain in 
discounted life expectancy. 
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By contrast, the following would appear to be essentially inappropriate procedures in the case of 
adults who are members of the current generation: 
 
5.2 Inappropriate procedures for adults in the current generation 
 
 Estimate the gain in life expectancy on an undiscounted basis and then apply VSLYa  regardless 
of the nature of the perturbation in future hazard rates that has generated the gain. For gains in 
life expectancy generated by multiperiod reductions in future hazard rates this could serious ly 
overestimate the resultant benefit. 
 Estimate the gain in life expectancy on an undiscounted basis and then apply VSLYd computed as 
the VSL divided by discounted life expectancy for the typical individual.  
 Apply either of the appropriate procedures to estimate the benefit of a gain in life expectancy 
and then subject the resultant benefit to further discounting. 
 
The “annuity” approach to the calculation of discounted life expectancy (under which the latter is 
treated as the discounted present value of a one-unit, n-year annuity when life expectancy is n years) 
is not included in the list of inappropriate procedures since, as argued earlier, the error involved in 
using this approach seems likely to be limited and the approach has the clear advantage of being 
simple and straightforward to apply.  
 
Up to this point the focus in this section has been on adults who are members of the current 
generation. It therefore remains to address the question of how to deal a) with the case of children in 
the current generation and b) adults and children in future generations. 
 
5.3 Children in the current generation 
 
The most straightforward way in which to deal with the valuation of life expectancy gains for 
children who are currently alive would appear to be by applying VSLYd (which has been shown to be 
independent of both age and the nature of the hazard rate perturbation)  to the appropriately 
discounted gain in life expectancy. If it is then decided that health and safety gains for children 
should stand at a premium - as argued should be the case in, for example, US EPA (2003),  OECD 
(2010) and Hammitt and Haninger (2010) - then this can be applied directly to the resultant figure.  
However, if any upward adjustment is to be made to the VSLY for children then it would seem 
reasonable to argue that this augmented value should, strictly speaking, only be applied to gains in 
life expectancy resulting from reductions in those hazard rates associated with childhood years. 
Thus, if a gain in life expectancy for a child is the result of a one-off reduction in the hazard rate for 
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the coming year then the VSLY for the child should be set equal to the VSL - increased to whatever 
extent  is judged to be appropriate for children - divided by the child’s discounted remaining life 
expectancy. If, by contrast, the child’s gain in life expectancy is the result of hazard rate reductions 
that will occur only in later years when the child has become an adult, then it would seem difficult to 
justify the application of any premium to the VSLY.  
 
5.4 Future generations 
 
Finally, in the case of gains in life expectancy that will be experienced by members of future 
generations, it is important to appreciate the fact that the gain will effectively apply from the date of 
birth of any affected individual. The most straightforward way in which to proceed would then 
appear to be by deriving the value of the gain at the time of the individual’s birth along the lines set 
out above in Section 5.3 and then discount the result to a present value at whatever discount rate is 
judged to be applicable to benefits that will be enjoyed by future generations. 
 
Thus, suppose that it is expected that a gain in life expectancy will be enjoyed by an individual who 
will be born in 20 years’ time. The gain in life expectancy, appropriately discounted to the time of 
the individual’s birth at the personal rate, i, would then be valued using VSLYd  together with 
whatever premium it might be felt should be applied to health and safety gains for children. Given 
that the UK public sector annual discount rate applied to health and safety benefits is currently set at 
1.5%, the resultant benefit accruing in 20 years’ time would then be discounted to a present value by 
applying a discount factor of 𝑒−0.3.   
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
Intuitively, it seems natural to define the Value of a Statistical Life Year (VSLY) for a group of 
individuals as the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) for that group - based on individual marginal rates 
of substitution of wealth for risk of death during the coming year - divided by the average remaining 
life expectancy for individuals within the group. 
 
However, under generally plausible assumptions concerning individual preferences and attitudes to 
risk it appears that this definition of the VSLY is appropriate only if the gain in life expectancy being 
valued is generated solely by a reduction in the probability of death during the coming year and has 
been computed on an undiscounted basis. If, by contrast, the gain in life expectancy is the result of a 
multi-period perturbation in future hazard rates and/or the gain has been computed on a discounted 
basis then the appropriate VSLY will typically differ significantly from the VSL divided by average 
undiscounted remaining life expectancy.  
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In light of this, there would appear to be two possible ways in which to place legitimate willingness 
to pay-based values on anticipated gains in life expectancy in public sector allocative decision 
making in the health and safety context.  
 
In particular, the first possibility would be to tailor the VSLY to suit the manner in which the gain in 
life expectancy would be generated. Thus for example, in the case of a reduction in air pollution, 
according to current epidemiological evidence one of the main benefits to those affected will be a 
gain in life expectancy resulting from a proportionate reduction in future  hazard rates. It then 
transpires that the appropriate VSLY to be applied in the valuation of the resultant undiscounted gain 
in life expectancy will be considerably smaller than the VSL divided by the average remaining life 
expectancy of those affected. It is also important to stress the fact that under this approach the VSLY 
will typically be a strictly increasing function of the age of those affected.  
 
The second possibility - which seems considerably more straightforward from a practical point of 
view - is to compute the VSLY as the VSL divided by average discounted remaining life expectancy 
and then use this to value the gain in life expectancy, with the latter itself calculated on an 
appropriately discounted basis. Under this approach the discount rate would be set at the sort of level 
that people appear to apply in their own  private health and safety decisions.   Amongst the several 
advantages of this second approach is the fact that, computed in this way, the VSLY would be 
applicable to any gain in life expectancy, whatever the nature of the perturbation in hazard rates that 
gives rise to the gain. In addition, for given levels of annual utility and marginal utility of wealth, the 
VSLY would be completely independent of the age of those enjoying the gain in life expectancy.  
 
Overall, therefore, there would appear to be a rather powerful argument in favour of defining and 
computing the VSLY on the basis of discounted life expectancy. However, if this approach is 
adopted  then  it is important to ensure that the appropriate discount rate and discounting procedure 
are applied. In particular, it would be necessary to set the discount rate at the level that individuals 
appear to apply in personal intertemporal decision making and quite inappropriate to employ the 
public-sector discount rate if, as is usually the case, the latter is set well below the personal discount 
rate10. Strictly speaking, it would also be inappropriate to compute the discounted present value of n 
years remaining life expectancy as the present value of a one-unit, n-year annuity, though according 
to the argument developed above it would appear that the error involved in doing so becomes 
significant only for those above the age of about 50.  
 
                                              
10
 In particular, the VSLY computed on the basis of average discounted life expectancy with the discount rate set in the 
region of 6% would be more than double that which results from applying the rate currently used in UK public sector 
health and safety decisions (i.e. 1.5%).  
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It must, of course, be admitted that in order to keep the argument as straightforward and  
comprehensible as possible, the model underpinning the analysis developed in this paper has been 
based on some rather strong simplifying assumptions. Arguably, the most significant of these is that 
the individual’s anticipated future annual utility flow conditional on survival can be treated as 
effectively remaining constant. In fact as suggested in, for example, Pliskin et al (1980), 
Johannesson et al (1997), Aldy and Viscusi (2008) and Hammitt (2013), it seems likely that the 
typical individual’s anticipated health and general quality of life may well be expected to deteriorate 
over later years of life so that, rather than remaining constant, the anticipated annual utility flow can 
be expected to decline, at least beyond some point. This would clearly have the effect of further 
increasing the extent to which the VSLY computed on the basis of undiscounted life expectancy 
could be expected to vary with the nature of the perturbation in future hazard rates that gave rise to 
the gain in life expectancy and would, in particular, increase the extent to which VSLYa exceeded 
VSLYb  and VSLYb  exceeded VSLYc . It would also mean that, strictly speaking, the VSLY defined in 
terms of appropriately discounted life expectancy (i.e. VSLYd ) would not be completely independent 
of the nature of the hazard rate perturbations.  
 
However, given that in the model underpinning our analysis future utilities are already subject to 
discounting at the personal rate, it seems unlikely that any plausible decline in anticipated future 
utility levels would have a very marked effect on the actual magnitude of the VSLY relativities 
reported above in Tables 1, 2 and 4.   It also seems somewhat improbable that it would significantly 
affect our conclusions concerning the  advantages of defining and computing the VSLY on the basis 
of appropriately discounted life expectancy. 
 
The analysis developed in this paper would therefore appear to have produced some very clear 
theoretical predictions which, if they could be supported by empirical evidence, would have 
significant policy relevance. However, as already noted, in an exploratory stated-preference study 
carried out by the authors and reported in Nielsen et al (2010), preferences over the three different 
types of hazard rate reduction (one-off first year, constant ongoing and proportional ongoing) - each 
of which generated the same gain in undiscounted life expectancy - were more or less evenly spread 
and this finding appears to be broadly reinforced by the results of a stated-preference study recently 
carried out by Hammitt and Tunçel and reported in this issue of the JRU - see Hammitt and Tunçel 
(2015). In particular, the Hammitt and Tunçel study also reveals a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity in respondents’ preference orderings over the three types of hazard rate perturbation. 
The results of these two empirical studies would therefore seem to sit somewhat uncomfortably with 
one of the present paper’s main predictions. Specifically, if all three types of hazard rate reduction 
produce the same gain in undiscounted life expectancy then, according to the analysis developed 
above in Section 2, the typical individual should have a clear preference for the one-off first year risk 
reduction over the constant ongoing reduction, and the constant ongoing reduction over the 
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proportional ongoing reduction. It would therefore appear that further empirical work aimed at 
shedding more light on the nature of the psychological process underpinning people’s attitudes to 
gains in life expectancy is urgently called for.  
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